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The ability to hold information brieﬂy in mind in the absence of external stimulation
forms the core of much of higher-order cognition. This ability is referred to as short-
term memory (STM). However, single-term labels such as this belie the complexity of
the underlying construct. Here, we review evidence that STM is an amalgamation of
three qualitatively distinct states. We argue that these distinct states emerge from the
combination of frontal selection mechanisms (often considered the domain of attention
and cognitive control), medial temporal binding mechanisms (often considered the domain
of long-term memory, LTM), and synaptic plasticity. These various contributions lead to a
single representation amenable to elaborated processing (focus of attention), a limited
set of active representations among which attention can be ﬂexibly switched (direct-
access region), and passive representations whose residual traces facilitate re-activation
(activated LTM).We suggest that selection and binding mechanisms are typically engaged
simultaneously, providing multiple forms and routes of short-term maintenance. We
propose that such a framework can resolve discrepancies among recent studies that have
attempted to understand the relationship between attention and STM on the one hand, and
between LTM and STM on the other.We anticipate that recent advances in neuroimaging
and neurophysiology will elucidate the mechanisms underlying shifts and transformations
among these representational states, providing a window into the dynamic processes of
higher-order cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
At the center of nearly all deliberative processes is short-termmem-
ory (STM)1. STM involves the retention of information in the
service of ongoing cognition, usually lasting on the order of sec-
onds. STM is used to hold in mind options when making choices
such as what to eat at a restaurant or whom to pick in a fantasy
football draft. It is used to keep track of trafﬁc when navigating
a car or crossing the street. It is used to comprehend this very
text and store goals for upcoming tasks. As a result of its far-
reaching impact, an appropriate model of STM is essential for
understanding cognition.
The importance of STM is underscored by the relationship
between variation in the capacity of STM and variation in
higher-order cognitive abilities. For example, STM capacity pre-
dicts substantial variance in reasoning, problem solving, reading,
language comprehension, and ﬂuid intelligence (Daneman and
Carpenter, 1980; Carpenter et al., 1990; Just and Carpenter, 1992;
Daneman andMerikle, 1996; Fukuda et al., 2010). Moreover, intel-
ligencehas been shown to rise as STMcapacity is increased through
training (Jaeggi et al., 2008). STM capacity is compromised in psy-
chiatric disorders such as schizophrenia (Gold et al., 2003), and
these reductions are predictive of a wide-array of cognitive impair-
ments (Johnson et al., 2013a). Hence, the amount of information
1The term “working memory” is also commonly associated with the maintenance
processes to which we refer. However, the term “working memory” is strongly tied
to a particular theory of STM and we use themore theory-neutral term“STM”here.
that can be held in STM is a critical determinant of cognitive
function.
While the importance of STM is without dispute, how to deter-
mine its capacity has been controversial. It is well-known that
initial estimates suggested that 7 ± 2 items could be held in STM
(Miller, 1956), which was based upon tasks that required sim-
ple repetition of digit strings. However, more complex tasks that
require concurrently holding items inmindwhile processing other
information have subsequently grown more popular (Daneman
and Carpenter, 1980; Turner and Engle, 1989) as have tasks that
require the detection of changes in arrays of visual objects (Luck
and Vogel, 1997, 2013). Critical to these tasks is the minimization
of strategic processes thatmight chunkmultiple items into a single
representation thereby rendering the number of maintained items
ambiguous. When chunking is effectively minimized by concur-
rent processing or brief retention intervals, capacity is typically
estimated to be 4 ± 1 items (Cowan, 2001).
Although a capacity limit of 4 ± 1 items is commonly observed
across a broad range of tasks, evidence suggests that not all items
held in mind are of equal status. In many tasks, a single item
among the 4 ± 1 appears to hold a privileged position, one that
makes it more accessible than other items. One task that reveals
this involves rapid serial presentation of items followed almost
immediately by a recognition probe (McElree and Dosher, 1989;
McElree, 2006). In this task, retrieval and decision processes are
carefully controlled by a response deadline. Varying the duration
of the response deadline on a trial-by-trial basis enables the ability
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to track the rate at which information about the correct response
accrues. Using such a procedure, it has repeatedly been shown that
themost recently presented item can be accessed unusually quickly
while the rate of retrieval of all other items remains relatively con-
stant (McElree and Dosher, 1989; McElree, 2006). Interestingly,
if subjects are trained to pace rehearsal after all items have been
presented, the most recently rehearsed item is accessed unusually
quickly rather than the most recently presented item (McElree,
2006). These data indicate that speed of access is due to an item’s
status in STM, rather than to its recent physical presentation. In
other tasks, it has been shown that repeated processing of the
same item held in STM is greatly facilitated, while switching pro-
cessing to another item held in STM incurs a substantial cost in
time (Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002). These data suggest that
although multiple items may be held in mind concurrently, at
a given moment, a single item maintains a uniquely accessible
status. Such considerations have led to proposals that multiple,
qualitatively distinct representational states exist in STM (Ober-
auer, 2002; Jonides et al., 2008; Oberauer, 2009). We elaborate one
suchmodel next.We begin by reviewing prior behavioral evidence
for the model and then detail neural data that will lead to a new
conceptualization of the underlying neural systems.
THREE-STATE MODEL OF MEMORY
Based on the evidence reviewed above, Oberauer (2002) pro-
posed a three-state model of STM (Figure 1). First, the model
distinguishes information that is actively held in mind from
information that is passively maintained. Passively maintained
information includes residual traces of representations that linger
either due to recent presentation or to associations with actively
maintained information2. Oberauer referred to this passive state as
activated long-termmemory (aLTM). aLTM is presumed to be the
source of phenomena such as priming and proactive interference.
By contrast, active maintenance involves binding information to a
context. Contexts may include temporal details (e.g., the current
trial in an experimental task) and/or other cues that may be asso-
ciated with the maintained items (e.g., originally presented color
or location). The active maintenance of these contextual bindings
makes the information directly accessible through an appropriate
contextual cue. The combination of the items and their bindings
is referred to as the direct-access region (DAR). Finally, among the
DAR bindings, a single item is selected for additional processing. It
is this selected item that is amenable to computational and trans-
formational processes (e.g., mental arithmetic). This privileged
item is referred to as the focus of attention. Hence, information in
2Some authors consider only those representations associated with active mainte-
nance when discussing short-term or working memory (Luck and Vogel, 2013).
While such a deﬁnition is useful, we also consider passive representations because
information is often transitioned from active to passive states and back during
ongoing cognition. Since we are interested in the retention system that is used in
the service of ongoing cognition, we admit both active and passive representations
in our considerations.
FIGURE 1 |Three-state model of memory. Left: illustration of the task
used by Oberauer (2002) to test the three-state model of memory.
Participants hold in mind two sets of digits. Red frames indicate the active
set whose digits are candidates for processing (e.g., top set). Black frames
indicate the passive set, which is recalled at the end of the trial, but not the
subject of operations. Mathematical operations are applied to the active set
thereby updating its contents. In this example, “−4” is applied to “5,”
resulting in “1.” Subsequently, “+2” is applied to the result, yielding “3”
and so on. At the end of the trial, all digits are recalled. In this example,
going left to right starting from the top, recall would be “6,” “3,” “9,” “7,”
“8,” “2.” Right: depiction of the representational states of STM according
to the model. The modeled scenario reﬂects the moment at which “−4” is
presented. The cue “−4” draws the focus of attention (FA) to its
corresponding frame. The number associated with that frame, “5,” is
recalled through location-digit bindings. All location-digit bindings for the
active set are maintained through the direct-access region (DAR). It is
assumed that items are also inter-associated with each other, as well as
other items that are not actively maintained (e.g., passive set). The passive
set, which is not contextually bound, is held in activated long-term memory
(aLTM).
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STM may be considered to be in one of three states: aLTM, DAR,
or focus of attention.
To test the model, Oberauer (2002) studied the task depicted
in Figure 1. On each trial, subjects were presented with two sets of
digits each associated with a different frame. The size of each set
was varied independently between one and three items. Either one
or both sets of frames were highlighted in red to denote that they
were candidates for processing. For simplicity, we will consider
only cases in which one set was highlighted. In this case, the high-
lighted set was deemed the active set while the non-highlighted set
was deemed the passive set. Afterward, a series of simple mathe-
matical operations appeared in the frames of the active set, one at
a time, and subjects were required to apply the operation to the
corresponding number and update their memory with the result.
At the end of the trial, subjects recalled all of the updated digits.
Two aspects of the task were critical: (1) subsequent operations
could be applied to either the same frame or a different frame. In
the latter case, a switch cost was hypothesized that would reﬂect
the cost of shifting the focus of attention. (2) The sizes of the
active and passive sets were independently varied. Only the active
set was hypothesized to be bound in the DAR while the passive
set was hypothesized to remain in aLTM. Consistent with research
indicating that searching information in STM slows as more items
are added to STM (Sternberg, 1966), Oberauer (2002) predicted
an active set size effect such that updates would be slowed with
higher active set sizes. Effectively, each update required a search
of the DAR – the more items bound in the DAR, the longer the
search. By contrast, no effect of the passive set size was anticipated
since passive items should be maintained in aLTM, but not the
DAR. Furthermore, the cost of switching the focus of attention
was also predicted to increase with the size of the active, but not
the passive set. This is because the focus of attention should only
shift among items in the DAR. The data conﬁrmed all of these
predictions providing evidence for the three-state model (see also
Oberauer, 2005).
Alternative models can largely be considered a subset of the
three-state model. Cowan (1995) suggested a framework which
does not distinguish the DAR and focus of attention. Instead, the
focus of attention is thought to consist of 4 ± 1 items, all of which
have an equivalent status. However, it is unclear how this model
accounts for the costs of switching between different items held
in STM. By contrast, McElree (2006) hypothesized a single item
focus of attention, but no intermediate state between the focus of
attention and aLTM. In this case, it is unclear how to account for
the active, but not passive set size effects. Hence, two-state models
appear unable to account fully for the various results described by
Oberauer (2002, 2005).
As the example above illustrates, it is often the case that infor-
mation is held in STM in the service of rule-based processes that
include condition and response bindings (e.g., arithmetic). While
the three-state model was originally formulated to accommodate
declarative content, it has recently been updated to include pro-
cedural content, as well (Oberauer, 2009). Under this framework,
proceduralmemory has an analogous three-state systemwith costs
in switching responses analogous to costs in switching the focus of
attention, and costs in switching sets of condition-action bindings
analogous to costs in switching sets of item-context bindings in
the DAR. It is then hypothesized that declarative and procedural
STM interact such that the focus of attention provides input for
condition rules while the output of those rules can be subsequently
input into the DAR (Oberauer et al., 2013). Hence, the three-state
model provides an account of dynamic aspects of STM, laying the
groundwork for understanding complex cognition.
NEURAL EVIDENCE FOR A THREE-STATE MODEL OF MEMORY
In a previous review, we hypothesized neural mechanisms that
could produce a three-state signature in behavior (Jonides et al.,
2008). At the time, we theorized that frontal areas provide top-
down bias on posterior cortices whose activity reﬂects the neural
representation of information in the focus of attention. Concur-
rently, the medial temporal lobe (MTL) binds information to its
context enabling a basis for context-based retrieval, as well as lay-
ing the groundwork for new long-term memories (Schon et al.,
2004; Ranganath et al., 2005). We conjectured that only infor-
mation in the focus of attention is instantiated by active neural
ﬁring. Information outside of the focus of attention was thought
to be sustained by rapid short-term synaptic plasticity (Zucker and
Regehr, 2002; Mongillo et al., 2008). Furthermore, we hypothe-
sized that the focus of attention can be ﬂexibly deployed among
all representations that share a given context in order to refresh
those representations continually. In this way, all items linked to
a context via the MTL reﬂect the DAR, and the focus of atten-
tion is cycled amongst them to maintain their ﬁdelity. Items not
linked to the currently relevant context were hypothesized to fade
gradually as a result of interference processes (but see Zhang and
Luck, 2009). The residual synaptic traces of such items were theo-
rized to correspond to aLTM. This produced a layered framework
wherein each successive state added a layer of neural instantiation
(aLTM: synaptic plasticity, DAR: synaptic plasticity + contextual
binding, focus of attention: synaptic plasticity + contextual bind-
ing + active cortical ﬁring). In work that followed, we and others
tested the model using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI).
We began by searching for dissociable neural signatures of
the focus of attention and the DAR (Nee and Jonides, 2008).
To do so, we adapted the rapid serial item-recognition proce-
dure of McElree and Dosher (1989) which had provided strong
behavioral evidence for a distinct, single-item focus of atten-
tion. On each trial, three items were presented serially followed
by a brief mask and a probe. We assumed that upon presenta-
tion of the memory set, each item would be represented in the
focus of attention until the arrival of the next memorandum,
such that at the end of the trial, the focus of attention should
linger on the last item (i.e., most recent item). Since encoding
and maintenance demands were identical across all conditions,
examining how information was accessed provided a window
into different states of maintenance3. Thus, probes matching the
3The mapping of fMRI activation, retrieval, and information representation is
potentially complex. In some cases, activation may reﬂect the retrieval process.
In other cases, activation may reﬂect information representation. In still others,
the two phenomena may be confounded such as the case with bindings when the
information that is represented (bindings) is also the means to retrieval (items are
retrieved through their contextual bindings). For the purpose of experimentation,
we were merely interested in identifying dissociations, or lack thereof, to provide
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most recent item should reﬂect access of the focus of attention
while probes matching either of the other two items would reﬂect
access of the DAR (Figure 2). Given our model, we predicted
evidence for distinct states. The essential logic was that if different neural regions
are involved in accessing different putative states, this entails that the states are qual-
itatively distinct. This, in itself, does not rely on, nor speak to, the functional roles
of observed activations. Interpretation of the meaning of the observed activations
is based upon our hypotheses and prior knowledge of the roles of various neural
regions in cognition.
that accessing items in the DAR would be accomplished through
contextual bindings and thus elicit activation in the MTL. Such
contextual retrieval was not predicted to be necessary to access
the focus of attention. Since the MTL has traditionally been
linked to retrieval from long-term memory (LTM), we chose to
keep the memory set within bounds of putative 4 ± 1 capac-
ity limits so that MTL activation during retrieval could not be
confounded with retrieval from LTM. Furthermore, the rapid
presentation of items and the brief retention interval provided
FIGURE 2 | Assessing representational states via serial positions.
Illustration of the task used by Nee and Jonides (2008) to dissociate the focus
of attention from the direct-access region. Three words are sequentially
presented followed by a mask and a recognition probe. Timing information
depicts the onset of each stimulus relative to the start of the trial. As each
memorandum is presented, it is assumed that it becomes the focus of
attention. Thus, upon presentation of “TOOL,” “TOOL” is the focus of
attention.When “LAKE” is presented, the focus of attention switches to
“LAKE.” As each item is presented, it is bound to the temporal context of the
trial. At the end of encoding, the last word, “DIRT,” is the focus of attention.
Two kinds of probes are depicted. The left depicts a scenario where “LAKE” is
the probe. This activates its corresponding representation. The bindings to the
trial context, maintained by the direct-access region, verify that “LAKE” is an
old probe resulting in a match decision. This elicits activation in the medial
temporal lobe (MTL). The right depicts an alternative scenario where “DIRT”
is the probe. Once again, “DIRT” activates its corresponding representation.
In this case, however, “DIRT” is the focus of attention, so it can be veriﬁed
immediately without the need to retrieve contextual information. This elicits
activation in inferior temporal cortex (ITC) and ventral parietal cortex (VPC).
Activation data adapted from Nee and Jonides (2011).
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further assurance that retrieval was from STM and not LTM (but
see Luck, 2008).
Retrieval of information outside of the putative focus of atten-
tion elicited activation in the MTL as predicted. Furthermore,
the amount of MTL activation closely tracked retrieval demands.
Behavioral data indicated a primacy effect such that the ﬁrst pre-
sented item was retrieved more quickly than the second item.
MTL activation closely mirrored this pattern, activating more for
retrieval of the second than the ﬁrst item. Around the same time
as our publication, Oztekin et al. (2009) published very similar
ﬁndings using a ﬁve-itemmemory set with both item-recognition
and judgment of recency tasks. However, in those data, retrieval
of the ﬁrst item (i.e., most distant item, serial position −5) did
not elicit activation in the MTL. Such data suggest that MTL acti-
vations drop-off for more distant items, perhaps at the limits of a
4 ± 1 capacity of the DAR.
The second point of interest was regions involved in the access
of the focus of attention. Our model predicted that the focus of
attention was unique in its association with activity in posterior
representational cortices. We conjectured that probes matching
the focus of attention would elicit increased activations in regions
involved in this representation, similar to match-enhancement
effects observed in object-sensitive temporal areas in monkeys
(Miller and Desimone, 1994). We found activation in the lat-
eral inferior temporal cortex (ITC) when the focus of attention
was accessed relative to other items. These areas were anterior
to temporal regions that demonstrate object-sensitive activity
such as the visual word form area (Cohen and Dehaene, 2004),
which we took to mean that the information was represented
in a more semantic than visual form consistent with abstraction
gradients in temporal cortices (Martin and Chao, 2001). Further-
more, increased correlations were observed between this temporal
activation and activation in the ventral posterior parietal cor-
tex (VPC) when the focus of attention was accessed relative to
other items. Across other studies, activation in the VPC would
prove to be the more reliable marker of access of the focus of
attention.
Having established dissociable neural signatures associated
with accessing the focus of attention and information outside
of the focus of attention, we next sought to establish whether
neural patterns of retrieval distinguished access of the DAR and
aLTM (Nee and Jonides, 2011). To do so, we used virtually the
same paradigm as before, but we increased memory load to six
items. We hypothesized that six items would exceed the capac-
ity of the DAR given its putative 4 ± 1 item limit. We reasoned
that rapid presentation of items and a brief retention interval
would minimize chunking that could otherwise expand the limit
to 7 ± 2 (Miller, 1956). Furthermore, we reasoned that at the
time of the probe, the DAR would consist of the items most
closely linked to the probe context. In this case, the context is
temporal so that the most recently presented items up to a capac-
ity limit would be bound via the temporal context to the DAR.
Once again, we assumed that the most recent item would be
the focus of attention. Behavioral data demonstrated a precip-
itous drop in retrieval accuracy between the third and fourth
most recent items suggesting that approximately three items were
linked to the DAR in our paradigm. As a result, we measured
activation to probes matching the second and third most recent
items as reﬂective of access to the DAR, with items beyond this
limit (i.e., fourth, ﬁfth most recent) reﬂecting access of putative
aLTM.
The results both replicated and extended our prior ﬁndings.
First, accessing the focus of attention was again associated with
activation in lateral ITC, as well as the VPC. In these data,
activations in the VPC were substantially more pronounced. Fur-
thermore, compared to accessing the focus of attention, the MTL
was more active when accessing the DAR, also replicating our pre-
vious results. In addition, theMTLwasmore activewhen accessing
theDARcompared to aLTM.This latter aspectwas surprising given
the important role the MTL plays in LTM, but was consistent with
patterns suggested by the data of Oztekin et al. (2009). Finally, the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) showed increased acti-
vation for probes that matched the contents of putative aLTM
compared to accessing both the focus of attention and the DAR.
Taken together, the data demonstrated a triple dissociation: access
of the focus of attention invoked VPC activation, access of the
DAR involved the MTL, and access of aLTM elicited the VLPFC
(Figure 3B). In a follow-up study, we repeated the experiment
using faces as stimuli (Figure 3A; Nee and Jonides, 2013). Here, we
tailored our analyses to individually measured capacity estimates,
associating retrieval from the DAR to within-capacity items and
retrieval from the aLTM to supra-capacity items. The same pattern
in VPC, MTL, and VLPFC was observed (Figure 3B), suggesting
that the three-state model applies in a similar manner across both
verbal and visual STM.
While our data support a three-state model of STM, a closely
related study produced somewhat discrepant results (Oztekin
et al., 2010). This study used a twelve-item serial recognition pro-
cedure with words in which the probe consisted of both an old
and a new item from which the subject chose the old item. The
probe method differed noticeably from our studies in which only
one item was presented as the probe and was judged as either
old or new (Nee and Jonides, 2008, 2011, 2013). Consistent with
our results, accessing the focus of attention (i.e., when the old
probe matched the most recently presented item) was associ-
ated with activation in the VPC as well as lateral ITC. However,
MTL activation was associated with accessing all items outside
of the focus of attention (i.e., both DAR and aLTM) and no
differences in VLPFC activation were reported. Although acti-
vation was numerically greater for probes matching the putative
DAR relative to putative aLTM, this difference did not reach sig-
niﬁcance. Instead, activations in the MTL varied as a function
of correct retrieval, with increased MTL activation for appro-
priately identiﬁed old items relative to inappropriately endorsed
new items. As a result, these authors settled on a two-state
model with a single-item focus of attention contrasting with all
other items that vary only quantitatively in memory strength
(McElree and Dosher, 1989; McElree, 2006). We speculate that
differences between these data and our own are attributable to
the two-alternative procedure. First, search demands may have
been increased due to the need to select between two probes.
In other item-recognition settings, new probes elicit greater
activation than old probes in the VLPFC (Nee et al., 2007).
Hence, VLPFC activation corresponding to new probes may
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FIGURE 3 | Neural evidence for a three-state model of memory. (A)The
task used by Nee and Jonides (2013) to examine neural correlates of the
focus of attention (FA), direct-access region (DAR), and aLTM in visual STM.
The task involved sequential presentation of ﬁve faces followed by a mask
and a recognition probe. In this task, the number of presented items
exceeded the capacity of the direct-access region. So, it was assumed that
the least recent items (i.e., ﬁrst presented items) would no longer be
contextually bound and be represented in aLTM rather than the
direct-access region. Reprinted from Nee and Jonides (2013) with
permission from Elsevier. (B) Conjunction of results across a six-word
version of the paradigm depicted in Figure 2 (Nee and Jonides, 2011) and
the ﬁve-face paradigm depicted in (A) (Nee and Jonides, 2013). Across both
studies, probes matching the focus of attention activated ventral posterior
parietal cortex (VPC), probes matching the direct-access region activated
the medial temporal lobe (MTL), and probes matching the aLTM activated
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). In all cases, activations related
to a given state were dissociable from those involved in the access of other
representational states. This triple dissociation supports the three-state
model of memory. Reprinted from Nee and Jonides (2013) with permission
from Elsevier.
have muted any existing differences in VLPFC activation between
different old probe types. Moreover, the need to distinguish
between two items may have increased demands on contextual
retrieval. Such contextual retrieval processes are hypothesized to
involve the MTL (Eichenbaum et al., 2007). As a result, the two-
item probe procedure may have masked differences within the
MTL and VLPFC that have been revealed by single-item probe
procedures.
Other work has examined the neural correlates of switching
the focus of attention. In one study (Lepsien and Nobre, 2007),
participants encoded a face and scene into STM. Thereafter, a
cue instructed participants to focus attention on either the face
or the scene. A subsequent cue asked them to either maintain
attention on the currently relevant object, or switch attention
to the other object. Inferior temporal areas known to be sensi-
tive to either face or scene processing closely tracked the focus
of attention: when attention was on the face, face-sensitive areas
were more active. By contrast, when attention was on the scene,
scene-sensitive areas were more active. Furthermore, dorsal pari-
etal cortex (DPC) and lateral PFC were active whenever attention
was oriented. These data are consistent with the proposal that
frontal-parietal areas direct the focus of attention while activ-
ity in posterior representational cortices instantiate the items in
the focus of attention (Jonides et al., 2008). In a related study
(Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012), participants encoded two of three
potential categories of stimuli into STM. Machine-learning algo-
rithms were trained to detect the presence of particular categories
of information in mind through the pattern of activation across
the brain (Norman et al., 2006). Thereafter, participants were cued
to one of the encoded categories and responded to a probe. Next,
participants were cued with either the same or the other cate-
gory and responded to a probe. Hence, the cues directed the
focus of attention to a particular item/category in STM. Inter-
estingly, only the pattern corresponding to the category in the
focus of attention could be detected. Although subjects could
successfully switch between items (demonstrating that informa-
tion about the non-focused item was still present somewhere)
the pattern corresponding to the non-focused item could not be
detected. These data are consistent with the idea that only the
information in the focus of attention is representedby activeneural
ﬁring.
Recordings from monkeys provide additional insights. In one
study, monkeys were sequentially presented with two objects fol-
lowed by a recognition decision on a matching or non-matching
sequence of objects (Warden and Miller, 2007, 2010). Record-
ings were made in the lateral PFC, with most object-selective
cells observed in the VLPFC. After presentation of the ﬁrst object,
object-selective delay activity corresponding to the ﬁrst object was
high, but this object-selective activity was substantially reduced
following the presentation of the second object. Instead, object-
selective delay activity was high for the second object following its
presentation. Hence, the most recently presented object was most
substantially represented in PFC neural activity. This is consis-
tent with the idea that the focus of attention lingers on the most
recently presented item in serial item-recognition tasks. Interest-
ingly, if monkeys were instructed to recall the sequence, rather
than recognize it, a different pattern emerged in the delay interval
following the second object.While early delay period activity once
again reﬂected the second object, this activity shifted to reﬂect the
ﬁrst object later on in the delay (Warden andMiller, 2010). Hence,
it appears as though the object represented by the PFC shifted to
prepare for recall demands. A further analysis of these recall data
revealed a periodicity in PFC activity (Siegel et al., 2009). Popu-
lation activity in the PFC was found to be synchronized at 3 and
32 Hz. Interestingly, information about each object in STM was
maximal at distinct phases of the 32 Hz cycle and this informa-
tion was modulated by the slower 3 Hz oscillations. The nesting
of high frequency oscillations within low frequency oscillations
has been hypothesized to be a mechanism of high-speed scan-
ning in STM (Lisman and Idiart, 1995; Jensen and Lisman, 1998).
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Moreover, 32 Hz corresponds roughly to the estimated rate of
human STM scanning (Sternberg, 1966) suggesting a common
data rate among primates. Thus, it is tempting to conclude that
these rhythms reﬂect the cycling of the focus of attention among
different items in STM to keep them active in preparation for
recall.
To summarize, neural data have provided evidence for a three-
state model of memory. In serial item-recognition paradigms, a
triple dissociation in neural activation has been observed during
the access of distinct states of memory (Nee and Jonides, 2011,
2013). Activation in inferior temporal areas and VPC accompany
the access of the focus of attention. The focus of attention can
be cycled among different representations through the action of
frontal regions with the information represented by the focus of
attention reﬂected in different areas of cortex such as ITC (Lepsien
and Nobre, 2007). Information is contextually bound by theMTL,
providing a means to access items outside of the focus of atten-
tion, but within the presently relevant context. This binding in
STM is presumed to lay the groundwork for new long-term traces
(Schon et al., 2004; Ranganath et al., 2005). Finally, information
that has weak or no associations to the currently relevant context
can be resuscitated through the action of VLPFC. TheVLPFCmay
work in concert with the MTL to retrieve such content and/or to
update appropriate item-context bindings (Nee et al., 2007; Nee
and Jonides, 2008). With these data in mind, we now consider
each of these potential mechanisms in more detail. Afterward, we
consider an updated neural model of memory in light of new
ﬁndings.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
ATTENTION
Increasingly, the mechanisms governing external selective atten-
tion are thought to correspond to mechanisms involved in
maintaining information internally (Kane et al., 2001; Chun and
Johnson, 2011; Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). This is in part due to
the predictive power of the capacity of STM on performance in
tasks requiring selective attention (Kane et al., 2001), the mod-
ulatory effect of STM load on selective attention performance
(de Fockert et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2005), as well as the high
degree of neural overlap in tasks comparing internal and exter-
nal selection of information (Kuo et al., 2009; Nee and Jonides,
2009). However, much of this research has treated STM holisti-
cally. What are the implications of different states of memory on
the relationship between internal and external attention?
External attention is often guided by an explicit goal, such
as searching for a friend in a crowd. In such situations, it is
hypothesized that an attentional template biases search toward
goal-relevant information (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). The
attentional template is presumed to bemaintained in STM. So, this
account predicts that the contents of STM bias external attention.
There are now numerous examples demonstrating that holding
information in STM causes external attention to be captured by
visual objects matching the stored contents (see Olivers et al.,
2011; Kiyonaga and Egner, 2013; Luck and Vogel, 2013 for recent
reviews). For example, when subjects maintain an item in STM
for a subsequent recognition test, attention is captured by irrel-
evant displays containing that item (Downing, 2000). However,
attention is not always drawn to memory items. In one study,
participants were presented with two items that were targets for
visual search (Houtkamp and Roelfsema, 2006). Each target was
presented on a different half of the screen. After encoding the
items, a search set was presented on one half of the screen direct-
ing a search for the target that had been presented on that side
(e.g., search for the left target). After reporting the presence or
absence of the target, subjects then searched for the other item
(e.g., search for the right target). Interestingly, search times were
not inﬂuenced by the appearance of the irrelevant target as a
distractor item (e.g., the right target as a distractor if searching
for the left target). Thus, even though subjects had to remem-
ber both targets, only the target relevant for the current search
inﬂuenced attention. Similarly, if subjects are given two items to
remember, one as a search target and another as a subsequent
item-recognition target, search times are unaffected if the recog-
nition item appears as a distractor (Downing and Dodds, 2004).
These examples illustrate that not all items in memory obligato-
rily become attentional templates. Instead, subjects can constrain
search to a single relevant template. This canbe accomplished if the
attentional template corresponds to the focus of attention (Olivers
et al., 2011). By contrast, items relevant only for subsequent oper-
ations may be passively maintained in aLTM to minimize their
interference with current task goals. Just as items in aLTM do not
impact the rate of search of internal information (Oberauer, 2002,
2005), items in aLTMmay not impact the rate of search of external
information.
Other aspects of the focus of attentionmimic patterns observed
in external attention. A recent study demonstrated that when the
focus of attention was directed to a recently presented item (called
“refreshing”), responses to probes of that item presented 100 ms
later were slowed (Johnson et al., 2013b). This pattern appears
conceptually similar to inhibition-of-return in external attention
in which attention is slow to return to a location that was just
processed (Posner et al., 1985). Such mechanisms are thought to
facilitate search, enabling disengagement of attention from an
already processed location/item in order to processes new loca-
tions/items. Hence, searches of STM may operate under the same
principles.
If the focus of attention corresponds to the attentional template
in search, we would expect similar neural activations for internal
searches of STM and external searches of the environment. As
we reviewed above, switching the focus of attention among items
in STM involves top-down control processes in frontal and pari-
etal areas that bias processing in object-sensitive temporal cortices
(Lepsien and Nobre, 2007). Very similar patterns are observed
when external attention is switched between visually presented
faces and scenes (Serences et al., 2004). A recent study directly
compared the neural correlates of shifting the focus of attention
in STM with shifting external attention (Tamber-Rosenau et al.,
2011). This study found highly overlapping activations across
both forms of shifting in the DPC and superior frontal sul-
cus (SFS) – the standard dorsal attention network (Kastner and
Ungerleider, 2000; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). However, a
machine-learning algorithm could distinguish subtle differences
in the patterns of activation across the DPC and SFS to appro-
priately classify internal versus external shifts. These data suggest
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that overlapping but distinct populations of neurons are involved
in shifts of internal versus external attention. On the one hand,
this result is comforting: if internal and external attention could
not be distinguished, we might mistake our memories for per-
cepts (Chun et al., 2011). On the other hand, that both forms of
attention exist in the same neural regions enables a high degree of
interaction between neurons responsible for internal and external
attention. Such an arrangement may maximize the efﬁciency of
the interaction between the focus of attention and external atten-
tion, facilitating the ability to search for attention templates in the
environment.
Finally, similar neural recruitment underlies target detection
of both the focus of attention and attentional template. While the
dorsal attention network guides the search process, the ventral
attention network reﬂects the process of detecting the sought-
after target (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Common recruitment
of the VPC in attention and memory has been hypothesized to
reﬂect a common mechanism of attentional capture across both
domains (Cabeza et al., 2008, 2012). Consistent with these ideas,
we and others have repeatedly demonstrated the involvement of
VPC when recognition probes match the focus of attention (Nee
and Jonides, 2008; Oztekin et al., 2010; Nee and Jonides, 2011,
2013). Such activations may reﬂect the capture of attention by
items that match the focus of attention in just the same way that
attention is captured by targets matching the attentional template.
We have suggested that the focus of attention and the atten-
tional template that guides external search are one and the same.
We have further hypothesized that targets for future operations
can be relegated to aLTM so as to prevent interference from cur-
rent goals. At the present, it is unclear how information in the
DAR that is not the focus of attention impacts external attention. A
recent study demonstrated that subjects can simultaneously search
through two colors at once to locate a target (Beck et al., 2012),
although search rates are slowed in this case relative to searching
through a single color. These data suggest that more than a single
item can impact search. It could be the case that simple features
such as color can be chunked into a single representation that is
then held in the focus of attention as the attentional template. Or it
could be the case that the focus of attention cycles between the two
items with both bound to the DAR. It is notable that mean search
times were about 200 ms longer for dual-cue searches relative to
whatwould be predicted by doubling the search time for single-cue
searches. If the focus of attention can be cycled at a rate of 32Hz as
suggested earlier (Sternberg,1966; Siegel et al., 2009), and the focus
of attention cycles between search candidates when searching for
two items, then cycling of the focus of attention may account for
the additional observed search durations. The estimated number
of objects searched was seven per trial, which when multiplied by
a constant increase in search rate predicted by 32Hz cycling would
roughly correspond to the observed 200 ms difference. While this
consistency is intriguing, future research will be needed to sort
this out.
CAPACITY AND THE DIRECT-ACCESS REGION
The DAR is presumed to bind a limited number of items to a
context, thereby enabling context-driven retrieval. It may be nat-
ural to assume that neural correlates of the DAR can be revealed
by parametrically manipulating maintenance demands. By this
logic, the need to maintain more items in STM places greater
demands on the DAR to link those items to a context, resulting in
more neural activity in brain areas responsible for these processes.
Many fMRI studies have used precisely this parametric logic to
examine the neural correlates of STM (seeWager and Smith, 2003;
Rottschy et al., 2012 for summaries). Such studies converge on a
frontal-parietal network with dorsal-ventral differences in frontal
activations as a function of material (Rottschy et al., 2012). As a
result, these areasmay be candidates for the operations of theDAR.
An important limitation of the standard parametric approach is
that as STM load increases, so too does difﬁculty in general. While
it is possible that difﬁculty can be operationalized as STMdemand,
it is notable that the commonly activated frontal-parietal network
is recruited across a variety of other demands, as well. For exam-
ple, a recent meta-analysis found little to distinguish STM from
other cognitive demands in the frontal-parietal network (Nien-
dam et al., 2012). Many of these functions, such as vigilance and
inhibition, appear to place minimal demands on contextual bind-
ing. So, it is likely thatmany of these frontal-parietal areas perform
rather general cognitive functions, but may not perform the bind-
ing operations that underlie the DAR. Noting the commonality
between areas involved in STM maintenance and cognitive con-
trol, we have hypothesized that frontal regions perform a general
selection function with different networks involved according to
the domain (e.g., verbal, spatial) of the content selected (Nee et al.,
2013). Under this idea, maintaining information in STM involves
repeatedly selecting that information (e.g., cycling the focus of
attention among items). Although repeatedly selecting content
provides a means to maintain information, it does not necessarily
contextually bind that information. So, binding may be related to
other brain areas.
Previously we suggested that the MTL is involved in contextual
binding in STM (Jonides et al., 2008) making it a likely candidate
for the operations of the DAR. At ﬁrst blush, this notionmay seem
inconsistent with the literature reviewed above. In particular, if the
DAR is central to STM and load is one means to drive activity in
STM-related networks, why is the MTL not consistently reported
in STM tasks? One answer may be that typical STM tasks place
low demands on contextual processing. For example, greater MTL
activation is observed when object-location bindings are main-
tained in STM relative to only objects or only locations (Mitchell
et al., 2000; Piekema et al., 2006). Hence, the MTL appears to be
engaged to a greater degree when contextual information is neces-
sary for successful performance. However, not all associations are
MTL-mediated. Piekema et al. (2006) observed that in contrast
to its involvement in object-location bindings, object-color asso-
ciations did not recruit the MTL. These authors speculated that
object and color information were already integrated in higher
visual areas obviating the need for MTL-mediated binding. By
contrast, when multiple features are represented in distant corti-
cal areas (i.e., object-temporal, location-parietal), the MTL may
be necessary for binding. Variability in binding demands across
paradigms may therefore explain the inconsistent involvement of
the MTL in STM.
Another possibility for the inconsistent reports of MTL acti-
vation in STM may lie in the competitive dynamics of the DAR.
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Oberauer (2009) hypothesized that interference limits the capacity
of the DAR. By this account, there is competition for item-context
bindings such that linking a new item to a context disrupts the
bindings that other items have to that context (Oberauer et al.,
2012). One possible consequence of such competitive dynamics is
that when too many items are maintained in STM, the overabun-
dance of competition severely weakens contextual bindings. That
is, when STM is loaded beyond a certain capacity, item-context
bindings are dissolved. Such erosion may be reﬂected neurally in
decreased activity in the MTL. In this case, activation in the MTL
may show an inverted U-shaped pattern as a function of load:
at low loads, MTL activity will be low commensurate with few
item-context bindings. As load approaches capacity, MTL activ-
ity will rise to a peak at which competition among item-context
bindings is manageable. However, at supra-capacity loads, com-
petition drives down the collection of item-context bindings, and
MTL activity is reduced. If this account is correct, studies that
have investigated STM with the expectation of linearly increas-
ing activity as a function of load may have missed relevant MTL
activations.
In fact, there is some evidence for the predicted inverted U-
shaped pattern in the MTL. In one study, participants performed
an item-recognition task on letters with loads of one, three, or six
items (Zarahn et al., 2005). Accuracy was near ceiling at all loads,
so load was taken as a proxy for the number of items maintained.
Consistent with numerous studies, activation in a frontal-parietal
network increased linearly with load. By contrast, the bilateral
hippocampi showed a parabolic pattern: activation was lowest at
load 1, highest at load 3, but intermediate at load 6. The authors
took this as evidence that the MTL is not involved in STM main-
tenance – at least for letter stimuli. However, if we assume that the
capacity of the DAR is 4 ± 1 items (Cowan, 2001), competition
for item-context bindings may have driven down MTL activation
at load 6 as the number of items exceeded the number that can be
successfully bound to a context4. A similar pattern was observed
in a recent study employing a standard change-detection task (von
Allmen et al., 2013). In this study, activations in the intra-parietal
sulcus (IPS) rose with the number of items maintained in visual
STM, but plateaued when capacity-limits were reached – a pattern
that has been observed previously (Todd and Marois, 2004; Xu
and Chun, 2006). Activations in the hippocampus also rose with
the number of items maintained, showing maximal activation at
loads that matched visual STM capacity estimates. However, for
supra-capacity loads, activation in the hippocampus decreased,
again showing an inverted U-shaped pattern across load. Taken
together, these data indicate that the MTL does, in fact, track
the number of items maintained in STM up to a capacity-limit.
When this limit is reached, MTL activation drops, potentially
4One might wonder why performance was near ceiling at load 6 even despite the
decrease in MTL activation. As will be made clear when we discuss our model
later, we hypothesize two parallel systems of maintenance: a frontal-posterior sys-
tem involved in item-based maintenance and a MTL-posterior system involved in
maintaining contextual bindings. In an item-recognition task, the demand on con-
textual processes is minimized and performance is anticipated to be preserved in
such a task even if MTL-mediated contextual processes are down-regulated. This
is because frontal-posterior networks are sufﬁcient for the maintenance of strictly
item-based information.
due to the interference of item-context bindings through
competition.
Our hypothesis about the central role of the MTL in STM con-
tradicts the classic view that the MTL is critical for LTM, but
not STM. This view is largely supported by data demonstrating
impaired LTM, but intact STM, in patients with MTL damage
(Scoville and Milner, 1957; Cave and Squire, 1992). However, a
number of more recent studies have demonstrated that patients
with MTL damage show worse performance than matched con-
trols when tested with STM tasks requiring the maintenance of
item-context bindings (Hannula et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2006;
Finke et al., 2008; Pertzov et al., 2013). In an elegant study,
healthy controls and patients with a treatable form of autoim-
mune encephalitis that targets the hippocampus performed two
experiments requiring the recall of item-context bindings (Pert-
zov et al., 2013). In the ﬁrst experiment, one or three objects were
simultaneously presented at different locations followed by a brief
delay and then two probe objects – one old and one new. Par-
ticipants were required to identify the old object (identiﬁcation
task). Thereafter, participants were required to drag the identiﬁed
object to its originally presented location (localization task) using
memory of item-location bindings. Patients showed identical per-
formance to controls in the identiﬁcation task at both loads and
the localization task with only one item. However, patients were
impaired in the localization task with three items. Further analysis
into the nature of the impairment revealed that patients erro-
neously dragged objects into the locations in which other objects
had appeared on the trial. That is, patients “swapped” the object-
location bindings and did so twice as often as matched controls.
In a second experiment, participants were presented with col-
ored bars in different orientations. Thereafter, a probe bar was
presented which was to be rotated to match its originally pre-
sented orientation. The same pattern held: patients erroneously
rotated the probe bar to a different object’s orientation more
often than controls. Finally, one of the patients was re-tested
several times after intravenous immunoglobulin injections were
administered to treat the encephalitis. Little improvement was
observed in the second testing 5months post-treatment indicating
a modest re-test beneﬁt at best. However, performance improved
dramatically and approached the performance of controls 10 and
25 months post-treatment. Hence, treatment appeared to restore
the item-context binding functions of the MTL. Together, these
data demonstrate strong evidence that the MTL is essential for
maintaining item-context bindings even in STM.
The above data indicate dual mechanisms of maintenance in
STM. On the one hand, a frontal-posterior network selects items
and cycled-selection underlies item-based maintenance. On the
other hand, the MTL maintains item-context bindings in STM.
We suggest that although the former has traditionally dominated
discussion of STM, it is the latter that forms the basis of the DAR.
Moreover, these mechanisms are likely to be complementary and
interactive. For example, if an item representation is lost through
failed frontal-posterior maintenance, it can potentially be recov-
ered through contextual bindings. How might such interactions
occur?
In a meta-analysis of tasks involving cognitive control over
STM, we observed that different frontal networks are engaged
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depending upon the type of controlled content (Nee et al., 2013).
In particular, dorsal frontal areas were consistently activated
by control over spatial STM, whereas the VLPFC was engaged
in control over object and verbal STM. We hypothesized that
this dorsal-ventral dichotomy reﬂected an extension of the well-
characterized dorsal/spatial, ventral/object distinction observed
in posterior cortices (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982) into the
frontal lobes (Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000). Similar conclu-
sions have been reached on the basis of lesion (D’Esposito and
Postle, 1999; Muller and Knight, 2006) and transcranial mag-
netic stimulation data (Mottaghy et al., 2002). The essential idea
is that frontal areas are involved in top-down selection (Miller
and Cohen, 2001) where the form of the selection is dictated
by the areas with which the frontal lobes communicate. Dorsal
frontal areas select spatial content because they are connected to
parietal areas that represent space. Ventral frontal areas select
identity content because they are connected to temporal areas
that represent objects. Frontal areas are also connected to the
MTL (Goldman-Rakic et al., 1984). Through these connections,
the PFC may interact with the contextual bindings that underlie
the DAR.
One manipulation that may modulate PFC-MTL communi-
cation is STM load. As more items are maintained in STM, the
likelihood that an item will be lost increases. Thus, there may
be greater demand to reinstate lost items through MTL-mediated
contextual retrieval. Consistent with these ideas, there is some
evidence that functional connectivity between the PFC and MTL
increases with STM load (Rissman et al., 2008; Finn et al., 2010).
One study examined connectivity among the PFC, MTL, and
fusiform face area (FFA) while participants maintained one to
four faces in STM (Rissman et al., 2008). Here, activation in the
FFA was assumed to be a proxy for the representation of faces in
STM. The study revealed three inter-related ﬁndings. First, as load
increased, the correlation between the FFA and MTL increased.
This is consistent with increased communication between the
MTL and FFA to form contextual bindings. Second, as load
increased, the correlation between the PFC and FFA decreased.
Third, as load increased, the correlation between the PFC and
MTL increased. Putting these latter two ﬁndings together sug-
gests that with increased loads, the PFC shifts from selecting the
items directly (i.e., PFC to FFA) to selecting the items through
their context (i.e., PFC to MTL). This could occur if item-based
information is lost with increased loads due to decay or inter-
ference thereby necessitating contextual-retrieval to reinstate the
lost information. Hence, these data illustrate a dynamic interplay
between the PFC and the DAR. It appears that the PFC can ﬂex-
ibly select different forms of content, be they items or contextual
bindings, with different demands dictating the form of content
selected.
MEDIAL TEMPORAL MECHANISMS OF MAINTENANCE
We reviewed evidence that the PFC can cycle through items in
STM (Siegel et al., 2009), potentially forming a basis for the main-
tenance of information. Similar dynamics have been revealed in
the MTL (Axmacher et al., 2010) indicating that the PFC is not
alone in its capacity for maintaining items. In particular, it has
been hypothesized that individual gamma cycles nested within
slower theta rhythms reﬂect the cycling of individual items within
a context (Lisman and Jensen, 2013). Evidence for this hypothesis
draws from both LTM and STM, and data recorded from rodents,
monkeys, and humans. Here, we focus on the human evidence in
STM.
Important insights into neural mechanisms of STM mainte-
nance in humans have been revealed by intracranial EEG (iEEG).
Two studies have demonstrated that as the number of items held in
STM increases, gamma activity in the MTL increases (Axmacher
et al., 2007; vanVugt et al., 2010). These patterns have beendemon-
strated using both faces and letters as stimuli, and they suggest that
the number of items held in STMmay be reﬂected in the MTL via
gamma power. Moreover, direct comparison of the same STM task
using iEEG and fMRI revealed that fMRI activation in the MTL
increased as a function of load in similar ways to gamma activ-
ity in iEEG (Axmacher et al., 2007). Hence, these data established
a correspondence between iEEG and fMRI in the MTL. Finally,
a recent study demonstrated increased cross-frequency coupling
between gamma and theta frequencies during STM maintenance
compared to baseline (Axmacher et al., 2010). In this study, gamma
amplitude increased at the peak of the theta phase suggesting
that theta activity plays an important modulatory role on gamma
activity, consistent with a gamma-theta/item-context association.
Interestingly, at all loads, the ratio between gamma and theta fre-
quency remained constant at ∼4. This held true even as theta
frequencies slowed signiﬁcantly with increasing loads. While it
is possible that this ratio is a coincidence, it bears mentioning
that it resembles the presumed 4 ± 1 capacity of STM (Cowan,
2001). This leads to the intriguing possibility that the ratio of
gamma to theta frequencies in theMTL determines the capacity of
the DAR.
Additional evidence for the relationship between the MTL,
theta oscillations, and STM comes from a study that compared
STM for relational versus non-relational scenes (Cashdollar et al.,
2009). This study used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to study
theta activity in patients with hippocampal sclerosis, patients with
temporal epilepsy without hippocampal damage (i.e., a control
group), and healthy controls. First, patients with hippocampal
sclerosis performed more poorly on tests of relational STM com-
pared to both control groups, but they performed normally on
tests of non-relational STM. These data are consistent with prior
studies demonstrating impaired relational STM in patients with
MTL damage (Hannula et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2006; Pertzov
et al., 2013). Furthermore, on a surprise delayed recognition test,
both control groups recognized relational scenes better than non-
relational scenes. However, patients with hippocampal sclerosis
did not show this effect. Such effects are consistent with the idea
that MTL-mediated STM (e.g., relational STM) lays the ground-
work for LTM (Schon et al., 2004; Ranganath et al., 2005), but this
relationship is absent if the MTL is damaged. In terms of neural
effects, both control groups demonstrated increased occipital-
temporal theta coupling during the maintenance of relational
STM, but increased frontal-parietal theta coupling during the
maintenance of non-relational STM. Patients with hippocampal
sclerosis showed the latter effect, but not the former, suggesting
that occipital-temporal theta coupling is MTL-mediated. These
data are consistent with the idea that frontal-parietal areas are
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important for item-based STM, but the MTL is critical for rela-
tional STM. Furthermore, these data suggest that the MTL binds
visual object relations through synchronizing theta activity in
posterior cortices.
Taken together, the data provide insights into how the MTL
maintains item-context bindings. TheMTL coordinates activity in
cortical areas through theta oscillations. This synchronous activity
in cortical regions provides a means to bind information repre-
sented in respective cortical areas (e.g., an object and a location).
Individual bindings are then represented by gamma activity that
is nested within theta oscillations. The number of bindings that
the MTL can maintain is thus limited by the number of gamma
cycles that can be nestedwithin theta, a ratio that should reﬂect the
capacity of the DAR. If more items are loaded into the DAR than
can be nested within unique phases of theta, it could be the case
that synchronicity is disrupted, thus providing a mechanism for
interference.
A NEURAL THREE-STATE MODEL OF MEMORY
Having reviewed the relevant literature, let us now return to ﬂesh-
ing out neural mechanisms that can account for a three-state
model of memory. This model is depicted in Figure 4. First, we
hypothesize that frontal areas are responsible for top-down selec-
tion. Information that is selected depends upon the nature of
the region with which frontal cortex communicates. Frontal con-
trol over dorsal parietal areas provides a basis for selecting spatial
information, frontal control over ventral temporal areas provides
a basis for selecting object information, and frontal control over
FIGURE 4 | Neural three-state model of memory. Top: a hypothetical task
requiring the maintenance of visual objects and attention shifting among
them. Four objects are presented and encoded into STM. Following a
retention interval, a cue directs the focus of attention to one of the objects.
A recognition probe is presented in the cued location requiring a
match/non-match decision. This is followed by another retention interval, a
second cue, and a second probe. Bottom: a model demonstrating relevant
areas of the brain and hypothesized psychological and neural processes.
The model has been simpliﬁed for depictive purposes. For full details,
consult the text. Mechanisms associated with the focus of attention are
depicted in green while mechanisms associated with the direct-access
region are depicted in red. Object information is presumed to be
represented in inferior temporal cortex (ITC) while spatial information is
presumed to be represented in the IPS. Each of these posterior areas is
connected to a corresponding frontal area. The IPS is connected to the SFS,
a region that is commonly referred to as the frontal eye ﬁelds. The ITC is
connected to the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). Each of these
frontal areas selects information represented in respective posterior areas.
Finally, the medial temporal lobe (MTL) is connected to both the IPS and
ITC and synchronizes their activity. (A) During the retention interval, the
MTL synchronizes the activity of the IPS and ITC in the theta range. Within
each theta cycle, stimulus-speciﬁc neurons ﬁre in the gamma range. Thus,
gamma activity nested within theta activity reﬂects the cycling of items
within a set. Moreover, item-location bindings are implemented by
MTL-mediated synchronized activity in the ITC and IPS. The connections and
synchrony correspond to the direct-access region. At the same time, the
VLPFC acts upon the ITC to support item-based maintenance. Here also,
individual items are nested within oscillatory activity. These mechanisms
periodically maintain the activity corresponding to each item in STM and
correspond to the focus of attention cycling among the direct-access
region. The SFS performs a similar function in concert with the IPS to cycle
among locations. (B) When a cue directs attention to a spatial location,
cycling ceases. Instead, the SFS ﬁxates on the cued location thereby
forming the focus of attention. Sustained spatial attention then activates the
corresponding object through connections established by previous
synchrony. While attention is sustained, only the attended location and
corresponding object are instantiated by active neural ﬁring. The
synchronous activity between neurons corresponding to location
representation and object representation strengthen the bindings between
them (thickened red line) potentiating future cued retrieval.
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the MTL provides a basis for selecting contextual information.
Given that different frontal areas are connected with each of these
more posterior areas, it is likely that dissociable frontal regions
are involved in selecting different content. The act of selecting
information is thus a means for directing the focus of attention. A
notable consequence of this formulation is that the focus of atten-
tion may be ﬂexibly deployed to an object, a location, or an entire
context. If frontal-posterior networks act independently from one
another, then each of these forms of content can be selected in
parallel thereby conferring a distinct focus of attention for each
form of content5. By such mechanisms, the model can account
for patterns of interference between two attention-demanding
tasks performed on the same type of content, but little inter-
ference between two attention-demanding tasks performed on
different types of content (Logie et al., 1990; Woodman and Luck,
2004). These frontal areas that are involved in content-selection
are hypothesized to be coordinated by other more rostral frontal
areas forming a hierarchical relationship (Badre and D’Esposito,
2009; Nee et al., 2013). Such coordination is likely to be neces-
sary in dual-tasking scenarios creating a dual-task cost even if
each single demand engages a distinct frontal system (Woodman
et al., 2001). This idea preserves the notion that the focus of atten-
tion is ﬁxated on a single chunk at a given time, but suggests
that a separate focus exists for each form of content. Further-
more,multiple“items”maybe selected indirectly through selecting
a context. This framework may resolve apparent discrepancies
regarding howmany items can“ﬁt”into the focus of attention (e.g.,
Gilchrist and Cowan, 2011).
Items are associated to a context through the coordination of
multiple cortical sites by the MTL. This provides a mechanism for
item-context bindings forming the basis of the DAR. Individual
bindings are reﬂected by activity in the gamma frequency, which
are nested within theta oscillations (Lisman and Jensen, 2013).
Capacity is predicted to be reﬂected by the ratio of gamma to
theta frequencies – the more gamma cycles that ﬁt within distinct
phases of theta, the more bindings can be maintained (Axmacher
et al., 2010). Moreover, coordinated activity provides a basis for
Hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949). That is, MTL-coordinated neu-
ral ﬁring during the maintenance of information in STM leads
to new LTM (Schon et al., 2004; Ranganath et al., 2005). When
coordinated activity ceases or is disrupted, bindings are no longer
considered to be actively maintained. In this case, rapid synap-
tic potentiation resulting from previous neural synchrony allows
item-context bindings to be reinstated.
What distinguishes theDARandaLTMis that the focus of atten-
tion cycles upon the former to maintain bindings.When the focus
of attention is ﬁxed upon a particular representation, and is thus
not cycling, the difference between the DAR and aLTM is largely
5The term “attention” is often associated with the spatial selection mechanism that
is, in turn, associated with dorsal networks (i.e., the dorsal attention network).
From our perspective, attention corresponds to the act of selection. So, whereas
the ventral selection system that we elaborate may not commonly be described
as an attentional network, we believe that, functionally, it serves the same pur-
pose. Hence, the focus of attention that we describe corresponds directly to the
selection of information of different sorts (spatial, object, or context) whereas the
traditional attention literature may speak more speciﬁcally to the spatial focus of
attention.
quantitative in nature. That is, theDAR simply has stronger synap-
tic potentiation. When the focus of attention is cycling among the
contents of the DAR, oscillatory neural ﬁring distinguishes the
DAR from aLTM. When a set of bindings becomes irrelevant, the
focus of attention no longer cycles among themand those bindings
become aLTM. Due to rapid synaptic potentiation, these bind-
ings are primed and can lead to proactive interference thereby
providing behavioral signatures for aLTM. Thus, rapid synaptic
mechanisms are responsible for aLTM.
To make the model and its predictions concrete, let us con-
sider an example task (Figure 4). Participants are presented with
an array of simple objects. Sometime thereafter, a cue indicates
that one of the objects will be the target of an upcoming probe.
Next, a probe appears at the cued location and participants indi-
cate whether the probe object matches the cued sample object.
Thereafter, another cue appears followed by another probe. Thus,
on each trial, participants must keep multiple items active (e.g.,
using the DAR) and switch attention among them (e.g., using the
focus of attention) in order to make appropriate decisions.
We will begin by assuming that spatial information is repre-
sented in the IPS and object information is represented in ITC.
(As an aside, if presentation was sequential rather than simul-
taneous (Xu and Chun, 2006), the IPS may instead represent
order information (Marshuetz et al., 2006)). Our model predicts
that there are distinct frontal selectors for each type of informa-
tion. The SFS selects spatial information from the IPS while the
VLPFC selects object information from ITC. Simultaneously, the
MTL synchronizes the activity in the IPS and ITC. Frontal areas
continually select their respective types of information and may
themselves be synchronized through other frontal areas (e.g., dor-
solateral PFC or frontopolar cortex). This synchronized cycling
between frontal and posterior areas forms the basis of mainte-
nance of item and location information, while the synchronized
cycling of the MTL and posterior areas forms the basis of main-
tenance of item-location bindings. Upon presentation of the cue,
attention is directed to the cued location. In this case, the SFS will
bias a particular location representation in the IPS. Through its
connections to the MTL, the object bound to this location will
also be biased. The associated object then becomes the attentional
template to which the probe object will be compared. Continuous
ﬁring, presumably in the gamma band (Fries et al., 2001; Grego-
riou et al., 2009), would then correspond to the location and object
in the focus of attention. As a single item is focused, cycling among
other items ceases. Thus, items outside of the focus of attention
will no longer be associated with active neural ﬁring. However,
after responding to the probe, the focus of attention is disengaged,
putatively through some inhibitory process (Oberauer et al., 2013;
Johnson et al., 2013b), and information that was outside of the
focus of attention is retrieved. This is done by exploiting rapid
synaptic potentiation of frontal areas to posterior areas on the one
hand, and the MTL to posterior areas on the other. For example,
if an object was lost due to failed potentiation between theVLPFC
and ITC, that item may be retrieved indirectly from SFS to IPS
to MTL connections which then re-active the appropriate object
through its associated location. Finally, upon presentation of the
second cue, the focus of attention again selects a single object
through its location. If the second cue was the same as the ﬁrst,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 796 | 12
“fnhum-07-00796” — 2013/11/22 — 20:39 — page 13 — #13
Nee and Jonides Representational states in STM
this selection should be facilitated. This is because of the strength-
ened binding between the object and location that resulted from
those representations recently being synchronized in the focus of
attention. Notably, recent empirical data support the notion that
the focus of attention strengthens item-context bindings (Rerko
and Oberauer, 2013). Thus, the focus of attention confers two
processing beneﬁts: one due to active ﬁring that makes a repre-
sentation amenable to further computation, and a second due to
strengthened bindings that makes recently focused items easier to
retrieve.
It is instructive to consider the impact of MTL damage on the
modeled task. Once again, upon presentation of the sample, the
IPS will represent spatial information, and the ITC will represent
object information. Each information-type will be maintained
by frontal areas through cycled selection. However, without the
MTL, posterior representations will no longer be directly bound
throughMTL-mediated synchrony. Nevertheless, some synchrony
may occur. This could happen if different frontal areas operate at
the same frequencies. Since object and location information were
presented simultaneously, this may set distinct frontal-posterior
networks to the same initial clock. This implicit synchrony may
persist for a short time, but due to stochastic processes, greater and
greater degrees of asynchrony would be predicted as time passes.
Furthermore, the more items maintained, the greater the demand
for precise phase synchrony to minimize interference, and the less
likely that this sort of auto-synchrony would be effective. Such
an account provides a potential explanation for why STM perfor-
mance can be spared at short intervals and small loads even when
bindings are necessary (Jeneson et al., 2010, 2012). Furthermore,
this account suggests that location and object information can be
independently spared, while joint bindings are confused when the
MTL is damaged (Pertzov et al., 2013).
This model is purposely ambitious to provide a number of
avenues of future investigation. One emphasis is on neural interac-
tions. Numerous areas of the brain are hypothesized to be involved
in STM, and fMRI data have convincingly localized these areas.
Such data have revealed that STM draws upon regions of the brain
traditionally associated with attention, as well as LTM, presenting
an interlocked picture of these domains. However, to understand
STM more thoroughly, dynamic aspects of shifts between rep-
resentational states will need to be explored. This will involve
charting out interactions between frontal areas and targets in
posterior cortices and the MTL as information is shifted among
different representational states. In this vein, recent work using
monkey neurophysiology has demonstrated intriguing shifts in
representational states in the PFC (Stokes et al., 2013). How such
shifts are mediated by interactions among brain regions remains
a mystery. However, the hypotheses raised here may provide an
important beacon for directing such research.
A number of mechanisms remain underspeciﬁed in the model.
Some contextual bindings mediated by the MTL are easy to con-
ceptualize such as the binding of objects and space. However, the
distinction between the DAR and aLTM is predicated on knowl-
edge of the bindings relevant for the current temporal context.
This suggests that in addition to object-location bindings, theMTL
will also need to establish temporal bindings. Some work has sug-
gested that the temporal context is represented in frontal areas so
that item-context associations are formed through the interaction
of the PFC, MTL, and temporal cortex (Polyn and Kahana, 2008;
Sederberg et al., 2008). It is also possible that item–item asso-
ciations are formed through interactions among simultaneously
active representations within a given area of cortex (e.g., multiple
objects in ITC). Such associationsmay provide an additional route
to distinguish information that is currently relevant. If such associ-
ations can be formed within a localized cortical area, they may not
requireMTLmediation. Hence, futurework that reﬁnes themean-
ing of “context,” the different sort of associations that the brain
represents, and how these associations are formed will provide
important insights for futuremodels. Moreover, the presentmodel
is merely descriptive in nature. The feasibility of these descriptions
and mechanistic predictions will be well-served by computational
formalism.
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